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Crises mark watersheds in two decades of entrepreneurship  development 
in post- Soviet Russia. These include the systemic crisis of 1990–92, the 
fi nancial crisis of 1998 and, fi nally, the economic crisis that has been 
in progress since autumn 2008. The latter one will presumably be a 
 starting point for new trends in the development of private sector 
in Russia and for re- conceptualizing government policy concerning 
entrepreneurship and SME. State authorities in Russia never clearly 
distinguished between entrepreneurship policy and SME policy, not 
surprisingly, because even researchers and experts lack understand-
ing of these two approaches. Audretsch (2002) emphasized that SME 
policies focus on existing  enterprises, while entrepreneurship policy also 
includes  potential entrepreneurs, therefore fostering change processes, 
and paying  attention to the overall framework for businesses and aspir-
ing entrepreneurs, whereas SME policy is focused exclusively on the 
enterprise level.
In a rapidly changing environment, like in Russia during the transi-
tion process, government policies to support SMEs and entrepreneurship 
cannot be explained and understood without a general understanding 
of the main trends and developments within the SME sector. Therefore, 
the next section outlines SME development and the main characteristics 
of small businesses in Russia during the last decade, before the chapter 
turns to discuss the evolution of SME and entrepreneurship policies 
since the beginning of transition. In a huge country like Russia the role 
of regional disparities in SME development and policy approaches of 
regional authorities becomes crucial and is discussed in the next section. 
The chapter continues to shortly summarize the role which international 
programmes and donor organizations played in implementing core prin-
ciples and institutions of a SME policy in Russia. Finally, conclusions are 
formulated on possibilities of a new entrepreneurship policy in Russia 
after the current crisis.
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SME DEVELOPMENT IN RUSSIA AFTER THE 1998 
CRISIS
The main aspects of entrepreneurship and SME development in Russia 
in the early- mid 1990s have been discussed in a number of studies (for 
example, Black et al. 2000; Centre for Co- operation with the Economies 
in Transition 1998; Earle and Sakova 2000; Frye 2004; Gaddy and Ickes 
1998; Iwasaki 2003; Moers 2000; Murrell 2005; Welter and Smallbone 
2003; Yakovlev 2001). Therefore, we will concentrate on a more detailed 
explanation of the last period in the evolution of small businesses in 
Russia (1999–2008), because this period has not yet been explored suf-
fi ciently in international publications. However, what is more important, 
without such an observation the shift in the State policy from ‘classical’ 
SME support schemes towards a more entrepreneurship policy oriented 
approach would not become clear.
In 1998 the crisis opened new opportunities for the development of ‘free 
entrepreneurship’, that is, entrepreneurship based on the recognition and 
use of opportunities rather than on ways to secure rent income after the 
departure of bigger players from the market. This is particularly true of 
those small and medium- sized enterprises whose business relied on local 
resources and was covering demand by the middle class, gradually recov-
ering and growing in numbers. Many of the current Russian gazelles, 
which represent the second or third tier of Russian business (mostly in 
food processing, clothes and footwear manufacture, business services, 
IT, consulting) emerged at that time. In the mid 2000s, the percentage of 
gazelles was estimated at 12 to 15 per cent of the total number of acting 
ventures, compared to 4 to 8 per cent in developed countries (Yudanov 
2008).
In the early 2000s, new developments and trends in the evolution of 
entrepreneurship in Russia occurred. The increasing wages (+10–20 
per cent per year) provided fuel for a fast growth of consumer demand, 
resulting in a boom in retailing, services and public catering and in a new 
format, too – there is a multiplication of trade chains, which became the 
core customers of national manufacturers of basic goods. Additionally, 
the federal government made a conscious choice in favour of the authori-
tarian modernization model very similar to the South Korean version of 
the 1960s and 1970s. A ‘business capture’ by the State led to the growing 
role of state- owned corporations and their strategic advantages.
In this context there is an increasing tendency towards ‘business 
capture’ by the State (Yakovlev 2006b). The weakness of civil society 
and the absence of real political competition and formal regulations for 
the recruitment of civil servants lead to government agencies and civil 
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servants becoming ever more noticeable in their drive to use their offi  ce 
of regulators and overseers to secure rent incomes. This results in corrup-
tion acquiring a new dimension: isolated bribes and gifts develop into a 
system of contractual relationships between business and bureaucrats. The 
problem has become so urgent that it is targeted by a special plan orches-
trated by the new president Dmitry Medvedev himself.
But the dynamics of small business growth in Russia is on the whole 
positive. For example, the number of incorporated small businesses 
increased from 1999 to 2008 from 900 000 to 1.34 million, and the number 
of employees from 6.2 to 11.4 million. (Nabiullina 2009).1 According to 
offi  cial SME statistics for 2007–08, however, no signifi cant upward trend 
in small business development appeared in the pre- crisis period (Table 
10.1). Alternative data, for example, the early entrepreneurship index 
(TEA), as measured by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (www.
gemconsortium.org), shows the same tendency for nascent entrepreneur-
ship: whereas in 2006 Russia was ranked tenth from the bottom in terms 
of this indicator, in 2007–08 it was already the last but one out of the 42 
countries surveyed. In other words, the share of owners of small business 
start- ups in Russia in the employable adult population was not only very 
low, with the 2006–08 indicator at 4.9, 2.7 and 3.3 per cent, respectively, 
but it dropped even lower in the last two pre- crisis years.
It is obvious that, given the faster growth of wages in the non- market 
sector and the ever higher economic and administrative barriers (especially 
Table 10.1 SME development in Russia from 2002–07, in per cent
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Average number of full 
  time employees (without 
freelancers and external 
contractors)
14.3 15.0 15.9 16.7 17.8 18.9
Average number of 
  freelancers
34.4 36.6 38.7 39.6 40.5 39.5
Average number of 
  external contractors
21.4 22.6 22.0 22.8 19.8 22.4
GDP share1 – 9.8 12.5 12.0 11.6 –
Turnover – – – 26.0 26.3 26.6
Investment 2.9 2.4 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.9
Note: 1. Share of small fi rms’ added value at GDP in market prices.
Source: Rosstat (2008), Table 1.1.
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the corruption of several inspections monitoring small fi rms), private 
enterprise was no longer an attractive alternative for potential entrepre-
neurs. This fact can only be interpreted as evidence of the business devel-
opment in Russia being unfavourable for start- ups and even for already 
established small fi rms. According to the ‘Doing Business 2010’ survey of 
the World Bank, Russia takes the 120th place among 183 participating 
countries (http://www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings/).
SME POLICY AND ITS ENVIRONMENT
Macroeconomic Stabilization Instead of SME Policy at the Beginning of 
Transition
The dominating group of the nation’s political elite in early 1990s – fi rst 
of all, the liberal wing of Russia’s experts and government offi  cials under 
Yegor Gaidar subscribed to the World Bank’s concept of the ‘Washington 
consensus’, that is structural assistance through macroeconomic policies 
and deregulation measures (Earle and Estrin 2003). However, the advo-
cates of targeted small business support, represented by lobbyists and staff  
of numerous governmental and non- governmental organizations that are 
part of the small businesses support infrastructure, disagreed with them. 
In 1991, this was a result of limited resources and a lack of tools for sup-
porting small businesses, as well as of the fact that in the absence of an 
established macroeconomic environment any fi ne- tuning intervention by 
the state would inevitably misfi re. It was decided that formulating eff ective 
antitrust policies, backed by privatization, would make it possible to put 
in place the preconditions necessary for establishment of small business 
at the grassroots level. The conditions suffi  cient for sustainable growth 
would be addressed at a later stage.
Privatization was an important institutional precondition for small busi-
ness emergence, but its implementation and outcomes in the post- Soviet 
environment were not what had been expected. In the absence of institu-
tions of market infrastructure or legally accumulated private capital, in an 
environment of high political risks, non- transparent prices for assets to be 
privatized, and, above all, with no concerted support available from major 
groups of the civil society, the initial radical concept of privatization, 
which provided for stricter restrictions on the bidding by so- called ‘red 
directors’, could not have been kept without undergoing major changes. 
Major concessions had to be made to populist interests and allowances 
for the actual alignment of forces within the society, including the clout 
of the former economic elite (Black et al. 2000, Radygin 1995). Once the 
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privatization was completed, private businesses created from scratch did 
not, in fact, receive any access to the property and other assets of former 
state- owned enterprises, and the commercial space (offi  ces, workshops 
and so on) lease mechanism made it to all intents and purposes dependent 
on the administration of post- privatized enterprises.
The Emergence of ‘Traditional’ SME Policy since the Mid- 1990s
From 1994 to 1995 onwards, after a complete change of the government 
team, a concept for small business support started to be developed. At 
that time, small businesses seemed to be a fast growing sector, and its 
protection should be used to solve problems of the labour market and of 
some specifi c groups of population such as former offi  cers of the declining 
Army.
In May 1995 the Federal Law ‘On State support of Small Business in 
the Russian Federation’ was adopted. The Law identifi ed small enter-
prises and the basics of government policies towards small business. The 
Federal Foundation for Small Business Support (FFSES) was appointed 
to  coordinate fi nancial measures for governmental support of small busi-
ness. At the same time, according to the above mentioned law, the State 
Committee for Small Business Support and Promotion (SCSESP of 
Russia) was set up. It was charged with the implementation of government 
policies in the area of small business, the formation of comprehensive 
infrastructure for small business support, including consulting, informa-
tion and fi nancial support, as well as the coordination of the Federal 
Fund’s activities.
It was during that period that a system of organizations and institutions 
for the support of small fi rms was started to be put together both at the 
federal and territorial levels, including territorial foundations and centres 
for the support of private enterprise. Until 1998, 73 regional funds and 
centres of entrepreneurship support were set up, in 44 Russian regions 
agencies for small business support were established (consulting, audit and 
so on), 36 business training and information centres, some science parks 
across the country, as well as legal and accounting/auditing fi rms, which 
catered to small business (http://www.xserver.ru/user/ff pmp/).
Local tax exemptions were introduced and funds were allocated from 
local treasuries for the development of a small business support infrastruc-
ture. Also, fi nancial support for small businesses was provided at both 
federal and territorial levels, drawing on the funds of dedicated founda-
tions. However, even the envisaged small- scale funding of the programmes 
(for example, in the last adopted Federal Programme for 2000–01 it was 
foreseen to use sources of diff erent federal authorities in order to fund 
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RUR 120 billion in 2000 and RUR 210 billion in 2001, that is less than 
EUR 10 billion in total), both on federal as well as on regional level, never 
was provided in full (‘Realisaciya’, without year).
Government policies and institutional arrangements for small business 
support saw continuous changes; and reorganizations and reshuffl  es took 
place on a regular basis. For example, the FFSES saw seven CEOs come 
and go between 1993 and 2002. In 1998, just before the crisis, SCSESP was 
dismantled, and the functions of small business support were reassigned 
to the Ministry of Antitrust Policy. The situation being what it was, one 
could hardly expect consistency in the implementation of practical meas-
ures. According to the Law ‘On State Support of Small Business’ (1995), 
Russia was to provide support for small businesses through the develop-
ment and implementation of relevant programmes at federal, territorial 
and municipal level.
Until 2002 four special federal programmes, as well as over a hundred 
territorial programmes, had been adopted and implemented. The imple-
mentation of federal programmes in the 1990s helped establish an infra-
structure for the support of small businesses at the federal and territorial 
levels, gain experience, review the support practices abroad, and identify 
best practices.
There was no appreciable eff ect, however, made by the said pro-
grammes to improve conditions for the growth of small businesses as 
such. Macroeconomic and political risks (like high infl ation) undermined 
the special support measures. Moreover, serious faults manifested them-
selves in the established system of state- sponsored support for small 
businesses. They included its orientation towards allocating solely budget-
ary resources, inadequate recognition of the needs of the entrepreneurs 
themselves when choosing support measures and tools, low transparency 
of activities of the organizations involved, and lack of competition for the 
governance of resources to be allocated. The major fault of federal (as well 
as of most territorial) programmes was the failure to monitor the results 
of the implementation of previous programmes; under such preconditions 
a waste of resources and corrupt practices were usual features of the state 
programmes and implementing activities.
New Agenda: Roots of Entrepreneurship Policy in the Early 2000s
The very limited results of the policies implemented in the second half of 
the 1990s caused the renewed government under Putin’s presidency to 
dismantle the bulky, inadequately funded and poorly performing system 
of small business support organizations. The FFSES was scrapped as 
early as the beginning of the 2000s, and the functions of think tank for 
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private enterprise support were transferred from the Ministry of Antitrust 
Policy to the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade (MEDT). 
The system of support organizations that emerged in the 1990s in most 
territories which was merely built on donations from the Federal centre 
collapsed in most regions as soon as the FFSES was shut down.
The government made a choice to change policies in favour of the World 
Bank- supported concept of indirect support of economic growth by way 
of structural reforms because in the conditions of a fragmented and weak 
state and highly opportunistic behaviour of public offi  cials the eff ects of 
tax reliefs and exemptions, subsidies and the like were totally neutralized 
by rampant corruption (Yakovlev 2006a, pp. 248–50). Moreover, the 
policy of structural regulation did not target any specifi c groups in need 
of focused support, although it prioritized the problems of growing SME. 
The early 2000s saw the dominance of an indirect support strategy of small 
entrepreneurs by reducing red tape and lowering the costs of entry and 
administration of business. According to MEDT estimates, by 2001 red- 
tape overheads were as high as 5 to 7 per cent of the GDP.
The main idea of the programme developed in 2000–01 (‘Long- term 
priorities of social and economic development of the Russian Federation’) 
regarding small business support, was to diminish state intervention in 
the economy, abandon excessive bureaucratic regulation in order to ease 
bureaucratic pressures on businesses and to improve the performance 
of government agencies in areas where their involvement is absolutely 
necessary. Core measures included lowering market entry barriers for 
businesses; eliminating technical barriers for manufacturing enterprises 
(reform of the standardization and certifi cation system); eliminating 
excessive and ineff ective administrative regulation of business activities; 
coordinating the actions of federal and territorial government agen-
cies, in particular developing a mechanism to represent the interests of 
citizens and organizations through self- regulating organizations, statutory 
 separation of the functions of regulatory and oversight agencies.
The government planned to address these tasks based on a package of 
new federal laws, together with a complete overhaul of the legislation gov-
erning business activities. It proved, however, impossible to implement the 
plan: laws were put in place at long intervals (August 2001 – June 2003); at 
least two of them were dropped (Law ‘On Self- Regulating Organisations’ 
and amendments to the law ‘On Consumer Rights Protection’). The ‘clean-
ing- up’ of former laws was not completed either. Moreover, the survey 
of administrative costs of business activities conducted by Russia’s think 
tank CEFIR (2002–07) suggests that the deregulation policy also produced 
only limited results, if any, although the overall results for 2007 (2000 fi rms 
polled  from 20 territories in seven federal districts of Russia) revealed a 
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number of positive changes in some areas of state regulation. For example, 
the average term of licences has increased, approaching the statutory 
requirement; a majority of oversight agencies committed fewer breaches 
of legislation, in particular, they undertook unscheduled inspections on a 
less frequent basis; the total number of inspections decreased signifi cantly; 
the incidence of pressure applied by civil servants with the aim to solicit 
a bribe in the course of registering ownership or lease of properties was 
much reduced and the transparency of the procedure increased.
However, CEFIR researchers also recorded deterioration in some 
areas. For example, the increased importance of personal connections for 
completing the registration procedure casts doubt on the eff ectiveness of 
the so- called one- stop; inspections in general and those by tax authorities 
in particular became more of a problem, compared to 2004; entrepre-
neurs feel that the situation with competition has worsened (presumably, 
they refer to the clout of big business used to unfair advantage at the 
 negotiation table) and that corruption has increased (CEFIR 2007).
It is no coincidence that in her fi rst public address on policies for the 
support of SME in 2008, the newly appointed Minister for Economic 
Development, Elvira Nabiullina, formulated a number of measures which 
to all intents and purposes usher in a ‘second wave’ of the drive to cut 
red tape for business (Nabiullina 2008). But even earlier, in the mid of 
the 2000s, as in the aftermath of dismantling the former system a vacuum 
in the area of support for private enterprise became more and more 
apparent, the government started to rethink its policies towards small 
business and entrepreneurship. In 2007, the eff orts culminated in a new 
Federal Law ‘On small and medium- sized entrepreneurship in the Russian 
Federation’, which was adopted after being in the pipeline for more than 
fi ve years in diff erent versions. Its main feature is that it identifi es for 
the fi rst time, in addition to small businesses, micro and medium- sized 
enterprises. It modifi es and supplements the criteria for classifi cation of 
private enterprise under these categories – these include, in addition to the 
structure of authorized capital and number of employees, limits on annual 
revenues. Moreover, the law identifi es schemes and forms of governmental 
support for SME.
However, the law is seriously defective in that it fails to identify the 
sources of funding for the policies to support SME (the ‘old’ law allocated 
– at least on paper – some of the federal fi scal revenues from the privatiza-
tion of state- owned assets), or the procedure for the selection of SMEs that 
would qualify for support. These drawbacks signifi cantly impair the per-
formance of this law as a regulatory framework for government policies.
Even before the new law postulated schemes and forms of support for 
small and medium- sized businesses, work began on a ‘Target- oriented 
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programme for the support of SME in 2005–08’. In spite of the legisla-
tion lacking many of the required preconditions (including the status of 
a ‘target- oriented programme’ as such and the concept of ‘medium- sized 
enterprise’), the programme introduced principles and mechanisms stem-
ming from the new understanding of both the role of small and medium- 
sized business and the capabilities and tasks of the state. What was new 
in the programme is that, fi rst, it focused on crucial target groups in the 
SME sector. These included innovative fi rms (the programme provided 
for access to resources and to facilitate entry into new markets), start- 
ups (development of expertise and access to resources), and sustainable 
growing SME (access to new markets and to resources). Other groups of 
SME were to receive indirect support in the form of legalization (devel-
opment of the necessary regulatory framework) and assistance in the 
development of management skills. For the fi rst time ever, some of the 
measures implemented as part of the programme were aimed at support-
ing nascent entrepreneurs. In addition, the ‘Target- oriented programme 
for the support of SME in 2005–08’ outlined not only the targets, but also 
indicators which can be used to measure the degree of their attainment.
Finally, the Programme provided a rationale for its basic support prin-
ciples, namely, decentralization of SME support mechanisms, co- funding 
(Federation and regions), a combination of entrepreneurship policy in the 
advanced territories and SME support in economically weaker territories, 
competition between state bodies and public organizations in the area of 
SME support, identifi cation and dissemination of best practices, priority 
support for fi rms with high growth potential and lowering of exit barri-
ers for less successful SME and incentives for cooperation between small, 
medium and large businesses.
Of special note is the need for open and transparent implementation of 
the Programme based on monitoring its progress and a regular evaluation 
of its performance, including the mechanism of third- party assessment as a 
means of minimizing the confl ict of interest for the parties involved in the 
development and implementation of the Programme. The programme’s 
initiators insisted on an annual update of the set of measures and funding 
objectives which was based on the evaluation of its performance in the 
previous year. In this sense, the concept of the programme was very close 
to what is meant under a ‘six steps’ assessment procedure (Storey 2005).
In the course of in- house coordination and subsequent implementation, 
however, many of the principles formulated for the renewal of the state 
programme got lost or were seriously distorted. For example, support 
was withheld for the idea of competition- based selection of an independ-
ent company to coordinate the programme’s implementation, and the 
functions were left with the Ministry itself – thus, a confl ict of interests 
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was guaranteed. No public hearings were held on its interim stages and 
adjustments required, if any. There was no public platform organized (not 
even on the MEDT website) in order to reach out to and inform possible 
benefi ciaries and civil society. Government also failed to arrange a bal-
anced approach to implement the programme as several of the priorities 
identifi ed received much more funding than other thrusts without any 
sound substantiation (Table 10.2).
Moreover, setting priorities and defi ning the next steps in the implemen-
tation of the programme for each following year took place behind closed 
doors of the MEDT. This makes it diffi  cult to ascertain the success of the 
programme. In any case, the impact of the programme on the dynam-
ics of the SME sector was relatively low, if assessed by offi  cial statistics 
which show that the input of SME in main economic indicators remained 
more or less stable and very modest (Table 10.1). Meanwhile, the slowest 
progress was made in supporting new ventures, exporting SMEs and 
increasing the involvement of SME in public procurement. GEM data 
for 2006–08 show that Russia still belongs to the group of countries with 
lowest share of nascent entrepreneurs in the adult population. Moreover, 
statistical data also illustrate that no signifi cant change was achieved in the 
modest state of innovative small fi rms (Rosstat 2009). The share of small 
fi rms’ participation in state procurement remains, according to expert 
estimations, at 1–5 per cent, far under the estimated target indicator of 15 
per cent of public procurement turnover.
The outbreak of the economic crisis in autumn 2008 put on hold the 
Table 10.2  Structure of federal budget expenditures and results of the 




Support of business 
 incubators formation
2730 Co- funding of 111 local, 
municipal and universities- 
based business incubators
Formation of venture funds 2151 21 funds, market capitalization 
– RUR 8 400 mln
Co- funding of regional 
 SME support programmes 
1593 SME support programmes in 56 
RF oblasts and krays co- funded
Formation of guarantee 
 funds
1556 23 funds, market capitalization 
– RUR 3 300 mln
Export support 170 380+ companies
Source: ‘Maly bizness: ot inertsii k innovatsii’ (2008).
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implementation of further mid- and long- term plans. In late December 
2008, support of SME was put on the ‘List of Priority Measures of the 
Government of the Russian Federation’ as part of its action against the 
eff ects of the global fi nancial crisis. In April 2009 a comprehensive and 
complex anti- crisis programme of the Russian government was adopted, 
including a list of measures addressed to support SME and entrepre-
neurship policy. Measures aimed at increasing the lending programme 
of the federal main agent in the area of fi nancial support for SMEs, 
Vneshekonombank, to RUR 60 billion and to provide RUR 10.5 billion 
from the federal treasury to fund the formation of small business start- ups. 
The latter includes measures such as lending, interest rate subsidies, pro-
vision of government guarantees, development of infrastructure such as 
science parks and business incubators, allocation of grants and implemen-
tation of training programmes. Moreover, the government was to provide 
a law for preferential treatment of small businesses in state and municipal 
procurement with a minimum quota of SME’s goods and services in 
public purchases of 20 per cent. This measure provides SMEs with extra 
800 billion roubles public purchases. Other measures referred to a resolu-
tion to lower the charge for power grid connection of low- consumption 
facilities and real estate funds for SMEs which provide SME with discount 
and long- term rental rates. Moreover, territories and municipalities are 
obliged to involve SME in the fulfi lment of government and municipal 
orders and to remove administration barriers to entrepreneurial activi-
ties, including restrictions on access to local markets. Additionally, meas-
ures have been implemented to reduce the tax burden on SME. Russian 
regional governments are in their own right to reduce the so- called single 
tax on imputed income from 15 per cent to 5 per cent. Deregulation meas-
ures minimize administrative burdens for start- ups in order to decrease 
start- up capital. For example, from July 2009 the registration of a small 
business has become simplifi ed. An entrepreneur only has to inform the 
government that he or she is starting a new business. Administrative 
inspections of SME activity in Russia are restricted to once in three years; 
and any additional inspections have to be permitted by a state prosecutor.
How effi  cient may the measures proposed be? As for facilitating access 
to credit facilities, the problem is not so much the level of credit as credit 
terms and guarantees, on which federal budget allocations have little 
direct eff ect, if any. It will naturally benefi t SMEs if their power grid con-
nection charge is lowered and they are granted the right of fi rst refusal 
to buy state and municipal assets which they have been renting for years 
and which have already been signifi cantly improved. Measures to reduce 
tax burden – by way of lowering the profi t tax – can be important for the 
few sustainable growing companies, which are still in the black despite 
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the crisis in progress. However, the share of such successful SME dimin-
ished very signifi cantly, whilst the main goal of an anti- crisis protection 
should be to support those SMEs who are suff ering from fi nance shortage. 
However, as for the right granted to territories to lower at their discretion 
the rate of single tax on imputed income, in the context of the territories’ 
rising budget defi cit this measure can be regarded as passing the buck to 
them rather than a real step in bringing relief to small businesses.
Having been portrayed by and large as priorities, the measures can 
hardly make a signifi cant impact because they have too little focus on dif-
ferent target groups and fail to factor in the pending changes in the struc-
ture of the sector of small and medium- sized business (fewer profi t- making 
and fast- growing fi rms and more ‘weak’ fi rms, inevitably rising number of 
necessity entrepreneurs, and so on).
Regional Diff erences in Entrepreneurship Development and Support 
Policies
A major roadblock to the development of SME and entrepreneurship in 
Russia has been, and remains, its uneven spread across the country, as 
well as the widely diff ering degree of territorial authorities’ readiness to 
facilitate the conditions for the development of eff ective private enterprise. 
Small businesses are spread across Russia in a very uneven pattern, with 
several groups of territories identifi able in terms of its development, as 
suggested by a survey on the development of private enterprise in Russian 
territories, which was conducted in 2005 by the National Institute of 
Systemic Research of Entrepreneurship (Migin 2006). The survey identi-
fi ed eight territorial clusters with signifi cant diff erences in terms of small 
business development (Table 10.3).
Small business development diff ers widely between individual territories 
in Russia as does the gross territorial product. There can be no doubt that 
these widely diff erent territories need diff erent ways and means regarding 
small business support policies, based on objectives that diff er in terms of 
complexity, diff erent levels of fi scal capacity, as well as diff erences in the 
level of relevant infrastructure development.
Regional diff erentiation of support policies, however, is hindered by 
external circumstances. The fundamental changes that took place in the 
2000s limited budgetary powers and burdens, thus signifi cantly decreasing 
the budgetary base of most regions of Russia. The federal and budgetary 
reform of the early 2000s led to a situation where the territories still had 
to honour most of their fi nancial commitments, but with their funding 
sources signifi cantly reduced. The importance of federal co- funding is 
highlighted by the fact that in only seven Russian territories federal 
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transfers amount to less than 5 per cent of the revenues in the consolidated 
budget, whilst the rest of the 80 territories are subsidized from the Centre 
to a much greater extent.
Given the current crisis, one cannot expect the governments of a vast 
majority of Russian territories to be in a position to implement any 
support measures whatsoever other than cutting red tape. The biggest 
problem of entrepreneurship and SME policies in times of the crisis is the 
contradiction between a need in locally targeted and operated policies and 
the lack of funding abilities (and often adequate concepts) on the regional 
level.
Summing Up: Progress with Government Policies
Government policies towards SME and entrepreneurship in Russia have 
passed through a number of periods. In the early 1990s the government 
followed the concept of the macroeconomic policy to establish main insti-
tutions required for a market- driven economy which were at that time 
considered more important than SME focused policies. In this context, 
the policy of fi nancial stabilization and privatization aimed at supporting 
preconditions for any kind of private entrepreneurship in general rather 
than targeting specifi c groups of entrepreneurs and fi rms such as start- 
ups and high growing SME. From the mid 1990s preference was given 
to the concept of supporting small fi rms by measures of a ‘traditional’ 
SME policy. Those are effi  cient under conditions of a balanced macro- , 
meso- and microeconomic policy in established market economies with a 
transparent system of effi  cient state regulating authorities. However, in the 
absence of any well functioning and recognized institutions, especially at 
the micro level, and a lack of fi nancial resources, this policy did not have 
any impact on SME development. During the crisis of 1998, this system of 
state support for small business began to collapse. Circles close to the gov-
ernment were convinced not only of its ineffi  ciency, ‘radicals’ complained 
about the total irrelevance of the small business support concept. As a 
consequence the pendulum swung back to the idea of entrepreneurship 
policy instead of SME policy.
By the mid 2000s, government started to realize the need to implement, 
alongside improving general conditions for business development, a tar-
geted entrepreneurship policy, to provide specifi c assistance to key groups 
of SMEs. With the crisis in progress, starting in late 2008 any large- scale 
support for nascent entrepreneurs is again all but abandoned in favour of 
fast- response measures.
There are several and recurring mistakes made in the develop-
ment and implementation of government policies towards SME and 
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entrepreneurship. This includes, amongst others, a limited involvement 
of civil society stakeholders in the process of policy development and 
implementation; absence of comprehensive analysis of policy back-
ground, progress and results; the failure to grasp not only the common 
features, but also the diff erences between policies to support small busi-
nesses (that is, fi rms) and those to boost the entrepreneurial potential of 
the society (that is, of persons), the latter being obviously underrated and 
fi nally, the absence of policy coordination at the federal and territorial 
levels.
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
IN SME AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP SUPPORT IN 
RUSSIA
The development of government policies for supporting entrepreneurship 
in Russia, especially in the period of early reforms, was undertaken with 
support from major Western partners. That included fi rst of all the EU 
and the USA, international organizations such as the EBRD, the World 
Bank, the IMF and the IFC, as well as so- called bilateral programmes, 
which involved bilateral cooperations with most developed countries. Of 
the 21 foreign donor organizations involved, the most prominent were 
USAID, the German Ministry for Economic Co- operation, the European 
Commission and EBRD (FEED).
As of the beginning of the 2000s, Russia has received technical assist-
ance worth more than $3 billion from a variety of donor organizations, 
20 per cent of which (or 2000 projects) was dedicated to supporting and 
developing small businesses. That included mainly professional training 
and exchanges, while policy support, consultations and equipment for 
small businesses accounted for about 10–15 per cent of the total techni-
cal assistance. Moreover, technical assistance is unevenly distributed 
across the Russian territory, with ‘the major portion being gained by the 
Central and North- Western regions and the Urals region’ (FEED, no 
date p. 34).
SME support programmes and projects of technical assistance had 
diff erent thrusts. Some focused on analytical and advisory support for 
reforms, monitoring business growth and business climate, while others 
concentrated on institution building such as microfi nance organizations 
and credit institutions, business associations and business networks, 
business education centres, or off ered management and business- related 
training. For example, the European Commission provided technical 
assistance, equipment and initial funding for the Moscow Agency of 
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Entrepreneurship Development and 23 other regional Development 
Agencies for SME Support. USAID focused on institution building at 
regional level. It created 19 business incubators, approximately 140 loca-
tions of technical aid and its credit lines totalled more than $600 million 
(FEED, no date).
Western technical assistance made it possible to quickly gain command 
of the legal and regulatory framework of developed market economies 
regarding the development and implementation of relevant policies, insti-
tution building, fi rst of all lending and fi nancial establishments, and the 
formation of a business education system. However, the eclipse of the 
authority of international fi nancial institutions in the wake of the Asian 
crisis of 1997 and Russia’s default of 1998, as well as the growing political 
antagonism between Russia and the West caused SME support activities 
of Western organizations in Russia to be rolled back, starting in the fi rst 
half of the 2000s.
Moreover, the overall situation had changed: Russia was experiencing 
sustainable growth in the 2000s, which rendered the model of technical 
assistance, put in place in the 1990s in an environment where institutions 
and governmental experiences in implementing and developing market 
institutions were lacking, superfl uous. It was time to move to a dialogue 
on a peer- to- peer basis which however, proved increasingly diffi  cult to 
realize because of the mutual disappointment in the aftermath of the 
turbulent 1990s. Many Western projects, which provided for the imple-
mentation of ‘best practices’ in an environment of ‘bad’ institutions failed 
to prevent the emergence of ‘crony capitalism’ in Russia. The Russian 
elite, on the other hand, seemed disappointed with the ‘unwillingness’ of 
Western organizations to take into consideration the rules (path depend-
ency) and norms (rather informal than written) of a transition economy 
and with their believe in ‘universal’ schemes and notions of international 
fi nancial institutions.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the description of SME development, as well as of the small 
business and entrepreneurship policy in Russia from the late 1990s 
onwards, we argue that shortcuts of the state policy towards SME 
and entrepreneurship were unavoidable. The reasons include a lack of 
adequate institutions (among them, a lack of experience in developing 
and implementing adequate policy) and strategic failures in selecting 
policy priorities. During the period of systemic transition, Russia would 
have been in dire need of an entrepreneurship policy which promoted an 
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environment for new ventures and thus could have helped to establish 
a broader stratum of ‘productive small businesses’. Instead, the govern-
ment tried to establish SME policies similar to that in developed market 
economies during the 1950s–70s. As a result, other – rent seeking oriented 
– forms of entrepreneurship (‘unproductive’ or even ‘destructive’, Baumol 
1990) became dominant. Under such circumstances, the ‘old fashioned’ 
SME policy was obsolete. It could merely conserve established enter-
prise structures, namely micro business with little added value creation, 
predominantly in retail trade and so on, but had no infl uence on shaping 
conditions for high growth new ventures. A new agenda from the early 
2000s onwards combined traditional SME policies and some important 
entrepreneurship policy measures. However, the agenda was still imple-
mented in the old bureaucratic manner with no transparency, no feedback 
from the SME sector, no monitoring according to clearly defi ned criteria. 
Therefore, it did not lead to a fundamental policy change. Moreover, 
in 2008, after the last SME promotion programme was completed, the 
crisis occurred, resulting in reactive instead of proactive approaches to 
 designing policies and support.
The chapter shows that in Russia, the strategic objective of 
 government  policies must be to support productive entrepreneurship 
and limit the options for rent- oriented or even parasitic growth of 
unproductive or destructive entrepreneurship. But this task must be 
recognized by  governmental authorities. Moreover, it involves funda-
mental changes in the system of ownership rights and the entire struc-
ture of social  relations, because the domination of unproductive and 
‘destructive’ entrepre neurship is inseparable from the system of owner-
ship power, which disguises itself as the system of private ownership 
and resists eradication. While mostly entrenched in the segment of the 
so- called super large and large business, unproductive and ‘destructive’ 
 entrepreneurship is  actually rooted in close personal ties of business 
owners and managers with the ruling political elite. An alternative is 
‘productive entrepreneurship’, which is mostly based in the segment 
of SME. However, it is forced to put up with the government’s veiled 
attempts to gain control and is not free itself from opportunistic behav-
iour patterns. Nevertheless, the sources of its income are still based in 
a diff erent area – in the area of realignment of market resources for the 
production of new benefi ts. Under such circumstances, traditional SME 
policies providing support for any kind of private enterprise do not 
undermine the positions of unproductive and ‘destructive’ entrepreneur-
ship. On the other hand, entrepreneurship policy, focused on provid-
ing advice and help for  starting ‘productive’ businesses can foster the 
 consolidation of the latter.
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Overall, SME policies in Russia have never been consistent, penetrating 
or comprehensive in their nature as this would contradict the interests of 
principal benefi ciaries of abortive reforms in Russia. Hence, to outline and 
conduct a balanced entrepreneurship policy, a suffi  ciently strong coalition 
to support such policies is needed. The groundwork for such a coalition 
to be put together needs the involvement of ‘productive entrepreneurship’, 
new professionals (since the value of knowledge will inevitably depreci-
ate if dominated by unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship), 
new regional leaders (because they have no potential allies or sources, 
other than SME, for fuelling the social and economic development of 
the territories under their jurisdiction), and the – at least – tacit consent 
of the nation’s leadership (because the ambitious goals set by it for the 
innovation- oriented economy under development cannot be achieved as 
long as Russia is dominated by unproductive entrepreneurship).
The current crisis seems to be a long one, and the measures announced 
by the federal government to promote SME and entrepreneurship appear 
to have little impact on SME and entrepreneurship development and 
especially on the motivation to establish new ventures. Changing the 
currently dominating inconsistent agenda for entrepreneurship policy is 
obviously required to create better preconditions for public supported 
policy which would be in favour of productive entrepreneurship.
NOTE
1. Note that in Russia up to the 2008 statistics have been gathered for small and incorpo-
rated fi rms only; the number of sole traders, according to the census of 2007, amounts to 
2.5 million.
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